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1 Introduction 
 
The last two decades have witnessed the primacy of monetary policy as the main tool used by 
policymakers in the stabilisation of inflation and output. Concurrently, commentators and 
analysts pay close attention to changes in policy rates in the belief that such changes, 
particularly unexpected changes, can influence the real economy. Reflecting these issues, 
greater attention has been paid to the qualitative and quantitative impact of monetary policy 
changes on output and asset markets but, less attention has been paid to the impact of 
monetary policy and the unemployment gap. The impact of any monetary change on the 
labour market is of great importance if we think that the Phillips curve implies that demand-
induced changes in inflation tend to lag behind movements in the unemployment rate. This 
implies that a comparison between the actual unemployment rate and the NAIRU may be 
helpful in forecasting future changes in inflation. 
This study will shed some light on the more general debate on the impact of monetary policy 
on the labour market in Europe. There are various policy lessons to be learnt if a significant 
and stable relationship between monetary policy and the NAIRU is found. First, by letting 
short-term interest rates deviate from a certain equilibrium level, the central bank may have a 
significant impact on output and subsequently, on unemployment. Second, in principle the 
European Central Bank is able to manage the policy for all the EMU countries. The question, 
however, arises whether the ECB chooses its policy in a context of countries that face 
divergent NAIRUs. In this case, the ECB’s monetary policy will have an asymmetric impact 
on unemployment.  
There are multiple aspects in our paper’s contribution to the existing literature on the real 
effects of monetary policy. One of the major problems associated with the NAIRU is its 
unobservable nature; in the literature various statistical and theoretical techniques have been 
employed (see e.g. Turner et al. (2001)), however there is a substantial disagreement on 
which is the best technique to employ to measure the unemployment gap. We differentiate 
from the previous literature in attempting to measure the NAIRU in three European countries 
using an unobserved component model. This statistical technique allows us to measure our 
unobserved variable without depending on any theoretical assumption or on any a priori 
imposed restriction. 
After having derived the unemployment gap, we assess the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between three large EMU’s countries labour markets and ECB’s monetary policy. 
The non-linearity is modelled using a Markov-switching (MS) regime autoregressive model. 
We intend to investigate the empirical performance of the univariate MS models used to 
describe the switches between different economic regimes for the three EUM countries’ 
NAIRU and, furthermore, extending these models to verify if the inclusion of monetary 
policy shock as an exogenous variable improves the ability of each specification to identify. 
Moreover, we investigate if the shocks are both, symmetric or asymmetric throughout the 
three large EUM countries. Hence, we study asymmetries using an extension of the Markov 
switching model described by Hamilton (1989). 
We measure the persistence of each economic regime, as well as the ability of each MS model 
to detect the impact of monetary policy on three countries’ unemployment gaps. Our 
empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, the null hypothesis of linearity against 
the alternative of a MS specification is always rejected by the data. Second, the introduction 
of the monetary shock specifications is never rejected. Finally, models with exogenous shocks 
variables generally outperform the corresponding univariate specifications which exclude 
shocks from the analysis. 
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In particular, asymmetries are supposed to exist where the estimated parameters of the 
alternative MS specifications are indicative of different regime-dependent responses of 
NAIRU. Most of the empirical studies which use an MS modelling approach focus almost 
exclusively on univariate models. Here we explicitly assess the dynamic impact of monetary 
policy changes on the movements of European NAIRU in the case of both an economic 
expansion and a recession. Furthermore we assess the impact of a change of risk-free interest 
rate on the unemployment gap. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical 
literature on NAIRU, explains the methodology we use to measure the unemployment gap 
and presents the results obtained for the NAIRU in the three countries. Section 3 describes the 
MS framework and our model selection strategy and discusses the empirical findings obtained 
by using MS models. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Measuring the unemployment gap 
 
Following the standard economic analysis, the NAIRU is defined as the rate of unemployment 
consistent with a stable rate of inflation; which is, unemployment will tend to rise above its 
natural rate when inflation tends to fall. The well accepted theoretical consideration is, 
therefore, of a negative relationship between inflation and unemployment gap (i.e. downward 
sloping Phillips curve).  
It is well known that the trade-off between inflation and unemployment is only temporary and 
cannot be systematically exploited by monetary policies aimed at permanently lowering the 
unemployment rate.  However, the Phillips curve also implies that demand-induced changes 
in inflation tend to lag behind movements in the unemployment rate, which means that a 
comparison between the actual unemployment rate and the NAIRU may be helpful in 
forecasting future changes in inflation. If the NAIRU helps forecast future inflation, then it 
can be particularly important in an inflation targeting policy. 
The great problem associated with the NAIRU is its unobservable nature. Labour market 
conditions, technological changes, demography, economic policy, are all factors that might 
have an impact on this variable. 
Various econometric models have been employed in the literature to estimate the NAIRU. 
The two most common approaches are the “pure statistical method” and the “reduced form 
approach”1. The latter approach reflect the conventional wisdom of a stable inflation-
unemployment trade-off; the dynamic model consist of an expectation-augmented Phillips 
curve, where changes in inflation are explained by the unemployment gap (i.e. the actual 
unemployment minus the estimated NAIRU) plus some other exogenous variables introduced 
to control for supply shocks. The unobservable NAIRU is then assumed to follow some 
preferred structure; finally the model is estimated recursively by maximum likelihood. What 
is striking among these studies is the dissimilarities of the estimates obtained; Laubach (2001) 
employs various specifications, and although his results show a general imprecision of the 
estimates, more importantly, he shows how the level of the unemployment gap does not 
significantly affect inflation. Opposite results are obtained by Turner et al. (2001) for several 
OECD countries, and Batini and Greenslade (2006) for the UK. Given the similarities of the 
model estimated it is easy to infer that either the dataset used or the model used to define the 
NAIRU is unable to consistently capture the joint process of inflation and unemployment. 
Similar criticism of the NAIRU estimates is made by Staiger et al. (2001); they test for 
                                                 
1 See Turner et al. (2001) for a review of the literature. 
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various inflation measures and conclude that the NAIRU cannot be estimated with much 
precision. 
One conclusion worth to note in Laubach’s (2001, p.230) results is that when the NAIRU 
estimate using a bivariate model and it is assumed to follow an I(2) process it appears “to 
match low-frequency movements in the unemployment data rather well raising the question 
whether it is in fact only the unemployment data that determine the estimates, that is, whether 
there is still any relationship between the estimated unemployment gaps and changes in 
inflation as expressed by the Phillips relation”. 
Taking into account previous empirical works, and in the absence of a superior reduced form 
model to use in order to estimate the NAIRU, we use a pure statistical method to decompose 
the unemployment in a short-term and a long-term component. Thee NAIRU will then be 
defined as the long-term and less volatile component. 
We define the unemployment series as: 
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The innovations ( )LRtt εε µ ,  are white noises with variances µσ , and LRσ . The above 
formulation for the trend has the advantage of being very general; a deterministic trend can be 
obtained by removing both the error terms. At the same time we obtain a random walk plus 
drift if the variance of the innovation on the slope component is equal to zero (or fixed), 
0=µσ . In this case the trend becomes I(1) instead of I(2). A smooth trend is obtained when 
0=LRσ . The short term component is modelled as an AR2 model: 
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Where Stε  is ( )Sσ,0  
The state-space model (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) allows us to recover the NAIRU and derive the 
unemployment gap. 
The model can be estimated using the Kalman filter algorithm as presented in Durbin and 
Koopman (2001). 
The estimation is computed on the unemployment rate2 for three European countries (France, 
Germany and Italy). The choice of the sample is essentially based on the need of including all 
the main events that have characterized government and monetary policies in the last few 
years: the seventies with the Bretton-Woods crisis, the eighties with the introduction of the 
European Monetary System (EMS), the nineties with the EMS’s crisis and finally the 
introduction of the single currency. In light of this, for all the three countries the sample 
1972:1 -2007:1 
The results are presented in Figures 1-3, and Table I. 
                                                 
2 Data are from the IMF International Financial Statistics collected from DATASTREAM. 
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Table I The Kalman filter 
 France Germany Italy 
AR1 1.647 
(0.0694) 
1.728 
(0.0588) 
0.9624 
(0.1291) 
AR2 -0.673 
(0.0656) 
-0.761 
(0.0580) 
-0.0013 
(0.1062) 
Trend innov var 0.100E+00 3.738E-03 1.006E-02 
Trend slope var 1.700E-04 3.463E-05 3.899E-04 
Cycle innov var 2.301E-02 2.339E-02 7.382E-02 
    
-2*log-likelihood -109.0253 -81.3593 60.8097 
Residuals diagnostics 
Ljung-Box stat. 
Q(4) 
2.0353 
(0.7293) 
2.5084 
(0.6431) 
13.5329  
(0.1089) 
 Notes: Values in parentesis for AR1 and AR2 refer to the standard error. 
The Ljung-Box statistics is for a check of autocorrelation for the first four 
autocorrelations Value in parenthesis is the probability of accepting the hull 
hypothesis of no serial correlation.   
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Figure 2: Germany Unemployment Gap 
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The NAIRU estimates indicates that our statistical model seem to capture quite well the 
dynamic of the data. The Ljung-Box statistics for serial correlation accept the hypothesis that 
the residuals are randomly distributed.  
For Germany and France there is a strong trend component, while for Italy the results follow 
the dynamic of unemployment with a negative shaped parabola. However, the results for Italy 
are surrounded by a much bigger uncertainty, and they are of difficult interpretation. 
The estimates show that the unemployment gap is highly procyclical as suggested by 
economic theory; during period of economic expansion gap widens since the level of 
unemployment falls below its long-run rate, the opposite occurs following an economic 
downturn. Finally, according to these measures the  
3.  Markov switching framework and the model 
 
There is mounting evidence that empirical models of many economic time series, particularly 
macroeconomic, are characterized by parameter instability (Staiger et al. 2001, Crosby and 
Olekalns 2002, Favero and Milani 2005). Using this notion, in this section we estimate the 
impact of the monetary policy changes on the unemployment gap (U-gap hereafter) allowing 
for regime switching in the dynamic of unemployment 
We investigate the ability of Markov Switching model to capture asymmetric reactions of U-
gap series to monetary policy stance under different states of the economy (expansion and 
recession). We define the U-gap series as: 
 
,, 0 , ,tSi t t U i t n r j t tU s U Rφ φ φ ε−= + + +  (3.1) 
 
where Uit is the unemployment gap generates from equations (2.1)-(2.3) in section 2, where 
the subscript i=1,2,3 indicates the three European counties. st is governed by an unobservable, 
discrete, first order Markov chain that can assume k values (states) and tε  is normally 
identically distributed, ( )2~ . . . 0,t sti i d Nε σ  error term. Rt is the innovation in monetary policy3, 
it is a (kx1) vector that contains all the monetary policy innovations in which, 98_1,tir  and 
1_ 07
,i tr  
capture a negative change in the policy instrument before and after the introduction of the 
single currency, respectively and, 98_2,tir and 
2 _ 07
,i tr  represent a positive change for the two 
sample periods.  
Thus, the aim of this part is to establish whether a change in monetary policy ultimately 
results in an increase of the unemployment gap and, as final remark, whether the effects of 
monetary policy on labour markets are symmetric or asymmetric. That is, whether a monetary 
policy can have different impact in an expansion and a recession period across the three major 
European economies. 
The introduction of Markov switching allows the coefficients φi and φr to switch between the 
two different states st = 0 and st = 1. If our hypothesis that U-gap at times has specific effects 
is correct, the unobserved state variable st is a latent dummy variable taking values either 1 or 
2, which indicates upward/downward phases. Nevertheless, we do not impose a priori neither 
different signs on the coefficients nor force the process to switch into the other regime at a 
certain time. The only restriction we impose is that there are two different regimes, while 
everything else is determined from the data in the estimation. 
                                                 
3 A change in monetary policy is defined as the first difference of the call money interest rate as reported by the 
International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
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3 Empirical results 
 
We first estimate the model without multiple equilibria using ordinary least squares, in order 
to test a purely linear model4. The results provide strong evidence in favour of a two state 
regime-switching specification. The explanatory powers of the linear models seem to be poor. 
Some coefficients do not have the expected signs and are statistically not significant. In Table 
II, the relation improves when the model is estimated taking into account an additional state.  
The second relevant issue is how to determine the number of states required by each model to 
be an adequate characterisation of the observed data. Our empirical procedure follows 
Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2003), who suggest selecting the number of regimes using Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC hereafter).5  Using Monte Carlo experiments they show that 
selection procedure based on AIC are generally successful in choosing the correct dimension. 
The values reported indicate that a switching model is preferred for all the three countries6.  
The coefficient φr,1 indicates how the U-gap responds to the impact of monetary policy 
innovation during a recession. On the other hand, the coefficient φr,2 can be interpreted as the 
monetary policy effect on U-gap in an expansionary phase.  
Figures 4-5 plot the smoothing probability of state 1 using estimation of equation 3.1. Simply 
taking 0.5 as the cut-off value for State 1 and 2; hence, the period with smoothing 
probabilities greater than 0.5 are associated to an expansionary regime while, periods with 
smoothing probabilities less than 0.5 are related to a recessionary regimes. In most cases, the 
smoothing probabilities estimated from U-gap suggest consistent periods of recession and 
expansion phases for the three countries. 
 
 
Figure 4. Smoothed probabilities Pre-EMU 
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4 These results are available from the authors upon request.   
5 We compute the value of the AIC for the linear models and the corresponding Markov switching models. 
6 The AIC  values for linearity versus two-states Markov switching model are: (-45.27) and (-51.28) for Italy;    
(-43.12) and (-74.96) for Germany; (-71.91) and (-73.85) for France. 
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Table II: Estimates of Regime Switching Model for three European unemployment gaps and Monetary Policy Innovations 
Markov Italy Germany France 
Parameter Pre-
EMU 
Post-EMU Pre-
EMU 
Post-EMU Pre-
EMU 
Post-
EMU 
Pre-
EMU 
Post-
EMU 
Pre-
EMU 
Post-
EMU 
Pre-
EMU 
Post-EMU 
 98_1
,tir  
1_ 07
,i tr  
98_2
,tir  
2_ 07
,i tr  
98_1
,tir  
1_ 07
,i tr  
98_2
,tir  
2_ 07
,i tr  
98_1
,tir  
1_ 07
,i tr  
98_2
,tir  
2 _ 07
,i tr  
φ0,1 0.5139 0.1658* -0.616** 0.3166♦ -0.297** -0.889* 1.4570 -1.007** -0.5557* -0.844** -0.112** -0.4264** 
φ0,2 -0.3569* -0.4012 0.427 -0.2236** 1.0607 0.2314 0.0562** 0.2301 0.9215* -0.372** 1.1074 -0.5955♦ 
φU,1 -0.085** -0.1264* -0.0032 -0.0554** -0.113** -0.5458* -0.1149* -0.044** -0.051** -0.117** -0.027** -0.0613 
φU,2 -0.0472♦ -0.0399** -0.0225* -0.0976* -0.029** -0.359** -0.0708* -0.0027* -0.03** -0.0356* -0.015** -0.0984** 
φr,1(1-98) -0.0479*    -0.233**    -0.5863*    
φr,2(1-98) -1.0626*    0.7822**    0.2738**    
φr,1(1-07)  -1.9011**    -0.4069*    -0.291**   
φr,2(1-07)   2.6839**     0.8531*    0.9542**   
φr,1(2-98)   -0.2845*    -0.999**    -0.081**  
φr,2(2-98)   -0.2059*     0.8929*    -0.3108♦  
φr,1(2-07)    -0.2772**    -0.219**    -0.4395** 
φr,2(2-07)     0.7148**    1.4759**    1.5177** 
             
p11 0.95 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.95 
p22 0.87 0.84 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.97 
σ2S1 0.405 0.154 0.503 0.145 0.724 0.379 0.570 0.274 0.349 0.259 0.521 0.105 
σ2S2 0.427 0.286 0.392 0.289 0.567 0.196 0.667 0.254 0.542 0.109 0.379 0.106 
Log-likelihood -67.53 -6.51 -69.14 -3.87 -109.92 -8.716 -106.96 -8.345 -83.37 -21.19 -70.81 -19.75 
AIC -75.53 -14.51 -77.15 -11.86 -117.91 -16.72 -114.96 -16.34 -91.36 -29.20 -78.81 -27.76 
♦significant at the 0.10 level; *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 0.01 level .
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Since we are interested in identify the effects of tight and loose monetary policy, we 
construct two monetary policy innovation variables. The first one 1,i tr  refers to negative 
changes in monetary policy (loose monetary policy), while the second one 2,i tr  refers to 
positive changes in monetary policy (tight monetary policy).               
 
Figure 5. Smoothed probabilities Post-Emu 
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This historical pattern of regime changes suggests that recession or expansion regime for the 
three EMU countries can be substantially divided into two main groups each one related to 
the duration of the single regime. The regime duration can play an important rule for central 
bank monetary policy implications. 
The smoothed probabilities are conditional on all available gaps and the same maximum 
likelihood estimates. The main thing to notice about the probabilities is that, for Germany and 
France unemployment gaps, there are seemingly periodic 3–6-year regime shifts (state 1 or 2) 
during the entire sample. While for Italy there are also regime shifts (from state 1 to 2) in the 
same period but they come at much less regular intervals 1-3 years. These results are 
presented in Table III.  
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Table III Conditional of being in state one or two, the expected duration of a typical 
 “Positive U-Gap” and “Negative U-Gap”. 
Duration Italy France Germany Average Duration 
Positive U-Gap 
State 1 
[1/(1- p11)] 
7.19 14.49 12.19 11.29 
Negative U-Gap 
State 2 
[1/(1- p22)] 
34.48 26.31 30.30 30.36 
 
Furthermore, for the three countries analyzed the results show that a positive monetary policy 
innovation increases unemployment gap. An economic interpretation of this statement could 
be that a positive increase in the aggregate demand generates a  positive, but temporary, 
increase in the demand for labour; this pushes the unemployment rate above the NAIRU, 
actual GDP above its potential, resulting in a positive output gap. As a consequence, there is a 
tendency to increase the wage rate which is then transmitted into higher costs for the firms 
and, therefore, higher prices for consumers’ goods and services; and the central bank raises 
the short-term interest rate. This process does not happen immediately, changes in the firms’ 
costs of productions take time to work their way into changes at the macro level. If we accept 
these steps, then, changes in monetary policy stance should be positively linked with the U-
gap. More specifically, a positive relationship between policy changes and U-gap implies an 
unemployment rate above its long run rate and/or negative supply shocks or expectation of 
higher inflation (Batini and Greenslade, 2006) 
Table II shows different signs of  1,rφ  and  2,rφ , before and after the EMU, for Italy, 
Germany and France. For state one, all the countries have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the usual confidence intervals. The indication is that during a 
recessionary phase an increase in the interest rate reduces the unemployment gap. For the 
second state of the economy, we note a positive sign for the three countries when the post 
EMU is taken while for Italy and France when the pre EMU is taken the coefficients have 
negative signs. Hence there is an indicator that during an expansionary period, a positive 
change in monetary policy tends to decrease the unemployment gap. 
 
Table IV Asymmetric effects of policy innovation on the U-gap 
 Italy 
 1
,i tr  
2
,i tr  
Pre-EMU 1 _ 9 8 1 _ 9 8
, 2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  2 _ 9 8 2 _ 9 8,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ>  
Post-
EMU 
1 _ 0 7 1 _ 0 7
,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  2 _ 0 7 2 _ 07,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  
 France 
 1
,i tr  
2
,i tr  
Pre-EMU 1 _ 98 1 _ 98
,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ>  2 _ 98 2 _ 98,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  
Post-
EMU 1 _ 0 7 1 _ 0 7,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  
2 _ 07 2 _ 07
,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  
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 Germany 
 1
,i tr  
2
,i tr  
Pre-EMU 1 _ 98 1 _ 98
,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  2 _ 98 2 _ 98,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ>  
Post-
EMU 
1 _ 0 7 1 _ 07
,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  2 _ 07 2 _ 07,2 ,1r rϕ ϕ<  
 
The variance of the two states ( 21tσ  and 22tσ ) changes from country to country. In particular, it 
is worth noting that for all countries, the variances of state one and two are smaller for the 
post-EMU than for the pre-EMU. 
Finally, we have to look at the possible asymmetric effects of policy innovation on the U-gap 
for the three EMU countries. The asymmetric effects of monetary policy come out in the 
estimations since we have 1,2, rr φφ ≠ . From table IV it is also discernible that the 
asymmetric effect were different before and after the EMU process.  
In particular, in the post EMU phase, for the all countries ,1 ,2r rϕ ϕ<  holds. This implies 
that changes in monetary policy instrument have a stronger impact during expansionary   
phases.  
Moreover, if the ECB follows a contractionary monetary policy then the effect on the U-gap 
returns to its long run trend (NAIRU) will be lengthier and larger during a recession. On the 
other hand, following the same policy, the effect of the ECB policy on two EMU countries 
will be smaller in expansionary periods. The results suggest that monetary policy is not 
neutral, at least in the short run and, there is some role for anticipated ECB monetary policy to 
affect the real sectors but that this role will also have asymmetric impacts on each single 
EMU country’s business cycle.  
Although the direction of the response to a change in the risk free interest rate is similar, with 
few exceptions, the magnitude is substantially different in both periods.  
This is in line with the results from other empirical studies. In particular, the results obtained 
by Kakes and  Pattanaik 2000, Peersman and Smets 2001 (using VAR methodology) and 
Maria-Dolores R. 2002 (using Markov switching model). It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to investigate the causes of these differences, but we can suggest few working hypothesis. 
Firstly, the labour market is intrinsically different in the three economies under consideration. 
For example, as noted in Calmfors and Driffill (1988) labour market concentration has an 
impact on the misery index7.  
Another cause of the problem could be the different fiscal system which is not harmonised 
across countries. At the same time, the lack of synchronization of fiscal policy across the 
European member states could worse these differences8.  
                                                 
7 The misery index is the sum of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. 
8 For a discussion of the effect of different fiscal policies in a monetary union see De Grawue (2005) 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
In the last few years a number of empirical works have tried to assess the impact of the euro 
and more specifically the impact that the single monetary policy has had on the economies of 
the member states. In this paper we have approach the problem looking at the unemployment 
gap and how it has reacted to changes in monetary policy. 
We started our analysis using a pure statistical model to decompose the unemployment in a 
short-term and a long-term component. This allowed us to derive the unemployment gap.  
In the second part of the paper we employed a Markov-switching model to see how our 
dependent variable has reacted to changes in monetary policy. We made use of two policy 
variables. First we use a policy shock calculated as a residual from a Taylor rule, and then we 
use a change in risk free interest rate. We have shown that in both cases there is asymmetry of 
response across the three countries. Moreover, our results indicate that the cross sectional 
differences in the magnitude of the change in unemployment gap following a monetary policy 
variation has not been reduced after the introduction of the single central bank. 
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